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THE ANTI CAR THEFT ACT OF 1992:
FEDERAL COPS, HIGHWAY ROBBERS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION
KEVIN J. COYLE*
INTRODUCTION
"Of all the inventions of the industrial age, none, perhaps, so
changed American life as did the automobile."' During the twentieth
century, at about the same time that state boundaries grew less impor-
tant to a motorized citizenry, constitutional law underwent a similar
transformation. Just as the car allowed average Americans to travel
across the country at will, the Commerce Clause,' as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, allowed the federal government to intervene in
intrastate matters that had formerly been beyond its reach.3
One of the results of this transformation of the Commerce Clause
was the expansion of federal criminal law.4 The federal criminal code
currently includes more than 3000 crimes, and congressional efforts to
add new crimes continue with each session.5 Much of the drive to
federalize criminal law is the result of public pressure to do some-
thing-anything-to combat rising crime.6 The growth of federal ju-
* J.D., 1996, Fordham University.
1. ARTHuR M. SCH.ESINGER JR., TmE ALMANAC OF AimEcAN HISTORY 454 (1993).
2. Congress shall have the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
3. "It is generally agreed that the modem scope of the commerce power, as a source of
legislative authority for Congress, is quite broad, even virtually unlimited." James M. Maloney,
Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate
Firearms Possession, 62 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1795,1796 (1994). See Alan R. Greenspan, The Con-
stitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 VAND.
L Rnv. 1019, 1022-24 (1988).
4. "Under current case law, however, constitutional constraints on the growth of federal
criminal law through the Commerce Clause are almost nonexistent." John S. Baker Jr., Nation-
alizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L.J.
495, 501 (1985). See Stephen Chippendale, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of
Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REv. 455, 461-65 (1994); Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause
Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARiz L. Rv. 271, 273-80 (1973).
5. Chippendale, supra note 4, at 455-56; Bill Rankin, Congress Crossing the Line to Create
New Federal Crimes? ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 30, 1994, at D1.
6. "Increasingly, though, the legislative and the executive branches have shown greater
willingness to extend the federal police power into areas of traditionally local concern because of
mounting public pressure for the government, state or federal, to 'do something' about crime."
Baker, supra note 4, at 518. See Elaine S. Povich, It's a Federal Offense: Crime Bill Loaded With
1
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risdiction over crimes threatens to overwhelm the federal court system
with cases that, in the past, would have been handled by state courts.7
The most recent crime to capture national attention is "carjack-
ing.",8 Carjacking is the modem equivalent of highway robbery.
Thieves steal cars from their drivers by use of intimidation or force,
often resulting in the victim's serious injury or death. Some blame the
rise of carjacking on sophisticated anti-theft devices, common in many
cars today, that make "hotwiring" too difficult or inconvenient for the
average thief.9 Carjacked vehicles are often sold to "chop shops,"
where they are stripped of their valuable parts, or shipped whole over-
seas for resale at several times their domestic value.10 This "multibil-
lion-dollar black market"" is said to be largely controlled by
organized crime.' 2
Amendments, Ckm. Thm., Nov. 14, 1993, at 1. In reaction to congressional obsession with anti-
crime legislation, Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware said, "If anyone proposed barbwiring the an-
kles of anyone who jaywalks, I think it would pass." Id.
7. The number of criminal charges filed in federal court rose from 27,910 in 1980, to 48,226
in 1992. In 1993, 17% of all federal cases were criminal, which has resulted in the tripling of the
federal prison population during the last decade. Naftali Ben-David, How Much More Can
Courts, Prisons Take? It's Tempting to Federalize Crimes, But Opponents Are Gathering Momen-
tum, LEGAL TimEs, June 7, 1993, at 1. "The concern within the judiciary is that the courts may
become so swamped with garden-variety criminal cases that their core functions of defining fed-
eral and constitutional rules, and perhaps their ability to handle civil cases at all, will be compro-
mised." Daniel Wise, U.S. Judges Are Wary of Fallout From Crime Bill- Concern That New
Crimes Could Swamp the Courts, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1993, at 1. Even the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court has addressed this issue:
Although legislative efforts are necessary in some areas, simple congressional self-re-
straint is called for in others, specifically, the federalization of crimes.... Those of you who
have read my Annual Report on the Judiciary know what I have been saying about the
recent tendency to federalize crimes for essentially political reasons without recognizing the
impact federalization would have on the federal courts.
William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Rela-
tionships, 78 VA. L. Rnv. 1657, 1660 (1992).
8. One report claimed that in 1992, carjacking incidents outnumbered bank robberies na-
tionally. Adam Z. Horvath, Hell on Wheels: Motorists Find 'Refuge' Gone as Carjacking
Spreads, L.I. NEWSDAY, Nov. 24, 1992, at 5 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics).
But see Ross Daly, Renewed Focus on Ancient Crime, L.I. NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 1993, at 17, in
which Geoff Sundstrom, spokesman for the American Automobile Association of Orlando, Flor-
ida, said, "It's our feeling that the crimes [against motorists] themselves are increasing, especially
carjacking, but we don't have any data to base this on."
9. "TIe crime has spread quickly from a few inner cities to become a nationwide source of
fear, as thieves find it easier to victimize motorists than defeat new, high-tech alarms." Horvath,
supra note 8, at 5. See F. Georgann Wing, Putting the Breaks on Carjacking or Accelerating It?
The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RicH. L. REv. 385 (1994).
10. Joseph A. Gambardello, My Car Is Gonel You Probably Won't See It in I Piece Again,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 11, 1993, at 6.
11. Id.
12. "During the past few years, organized crime has recognized the tremendous profits that
can be made by operating chop shops. Key syndicate figures are involved in chopshop activities
across the nation." H.R. REP. No. 102-851(11), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829,2851, quoting Memorandum of the National Automobile Theft Bureau
(Nov. 20, 1984). "Organized crime syndicates have been involved in auto theft at least since the
1960's. But since the 1980's, car theft has grown increasingly organized, as a new breed of ex-
2
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One particularly brutal carjacking incident is credited with provok-
ing a federal response. On September 10, 1992, Pamela Basu and her
infant daughter were abducted from the parking lot of a suburban
mall in Maryland.13 As the carjackers sped away, they pushed Basu
and her baby out of her car, but Basu's arm got caught in the seatbelt
and she was dragged for a mile and a half to her death.14 The Anti
Car Theft Act of 1992,1' which had been dormant for almost a year
before the Basu incident,16 was quickly passed by outraged members
of Congress and signed into law by President George Bush on Octo-
ber 25, 1992.17
Part I of this Note will chart the evolution of the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution, from a limited government of enumer-
ated powers to one of plenary powers that uses the Commerce Clause
to usurp the traditional state role of protecting the public safety,
health, and morals. Part II will discuss the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992
and examine it in light of the case law that has created what is essen-
tially a "federal police power." Finally, this Note will conclude that,
although much of the Anti Car Theft Act would pass constitutional
muster under modern interpretations of the Commerce Clause, one
section in particular is an improper exercise of police power best re-
served to the states and should be found unconstitutional.
I. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL POLICE POWER UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION
A. Enumerated Powers
The concept of federalism, in which power is divided between the
national and state governments,' 8 was made part of the Constitution
pensive and sophisticated cars, equipped with a growing array of gadgets and parts, multiplied
the potential profits from theft." Norimitsu Onishi, Your Car, the Sitting Duck, N.Y. Tmms,
Mar. 19, 1995, at 1, 10.
13. Horvath, supra note 8, at 5.
14. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
16. Ray Sanchez, Carjacking: The New Menace on Highways, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 8,1992,
at 54.
17. "This bill makes armed carjacking a Federal offense. The recent wave of these caijack-
ings has made the need for action clear." Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing
H.R. 4542 (Oct. 25,1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2903. But see Rankin, supra note 5, at
D1, in which Bruce Harvey, an Atlanta defense attorney, said, "Why make something like
carjacking a federal crime? ... Shooting someone is already a state crime. Attacking and rob-
bing someone of their car is already a state crime."
18. See Tm FEimEusr No. 32, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed. 1987),
which states:
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply
an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them would be
altogether dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a
1996]
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with the adoption of the Tenth Amendment.19 The Framers of the
Constitution intended the federal government to be a limited govern-
ment of enumerated powers.20 Since the Constitution expressly
granted the federal government authority over only certain specified
crimes, such as counterfeiting,' "Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations,"' and Trea-
son,23 general "police power" over the public safety, health, and
morals was reserved to the states.'
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Hudson2 5 and United States
v. Coolidge,26 explicitly rejected the notion of federal jurisdiction over
common-law crimes.2 7 But in Hudson, the Court stated, "[t]he legisla-
tive authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to
the United States.
19. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNs?. amend. X.
20. "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."
THm FEDERAIST No. 45, at 296 (James Madison) (Penguin Books ed. 1987). See Alexander
Hamilton's opposition to the Bill of Rights in THE FEDERALIsT No. 84, at 476 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Penguin Books ed. 1987), in which he argued that a Bill of Rights would be "dangerous"
because it "would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
things should not be done which there is no power to do?"
21. U.S. CONsr. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 6.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 3.
24. "The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the inter-
nal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." Tim FEDERAUST No. 45, at 296 (James
Madison) (Penguin Books ed. 1987). The "ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice"
was intended to belong "to the province of the State governments." Tim FEDERAST No. 17, at
157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed. 1987).
However, the federal government was granted "exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever"
over territory ceded by the states to serve as the "Seat of the Government of the United States,"
namely Washington D.C., as well as forts and other needed federal facilities. U.S. CONS?. art. I,
sec. 8, cI. 17. The federal government was also given "Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2. By specifying the limited circumstances under which
the federal government could exercise general police power, the Framers necessarily implied
that such power was unavailable under ordinary circumstances, and thus was reserved to the
states. "Police powers have always been identified as inherent powers of sovereignty. The fed-
eral government was not considered to have a general police power because the federal govern-
ment would thereby have ceased to be a government of limited powers as intended by even the
most nationalistic of the Founders." Baker, supra note 4, at 516-17.
25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
26. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
27. "Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature
of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not among those powers."
Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34.
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1996], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol22/iss2/3
ANTI CAR THEFT ACT
the offense."'2 This affirmed the power of Congress to enact criminal
statutes, but only when relating to the powers expressly granted by the
Constitution.29
B. Implied Powers
The Supreme Court expanded the legislative authority of Congress
in McCulloch v. Maryland.30 While acknowledging that the federal
government was one of enumerated powers,31 Chief Justice John Mar-
shall stated, "But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the
articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely
described." 32 Referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause,33 Mar-
shall found that several of the enumerated powers, read together, jus-
tified the implied power of Congress to charter a national bank. 4
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. '3
In dicta, Marshall addressed implied powers in the criminal context.
He pointed out that the power to "punish" was expressly granted in
connection with only the crimes of counterfeiting, piracy, felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.36
However, he decided that the power to punish was implied in relation
to the federal government's other powers.
This reasoning has been instrumental in creating a federal police
power. For example, Congress has been granted the power "[tio es-
tablish Post Offices and post Roads."38 Pursuant to this power, Con-
28. Id.
29. "As a result, federal criminal law became purely statutory." Baker, supra note 4, at 507.
30. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
31. Id. at 405.
32. Id. at 406.
33. Congress shall have the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
See M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 412-13. But see Baker, supra note 4, at 502, which states, "As the
federal role was represented during the Constitution's ratification debates, not even the 'neces-
sary and proper' clause gives the national government any basis for exercising a general author-
ity over ordinary crimes."
34. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 407-08.
35. Id. at 421.
36. Id. at 417.
37. "The good sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the power of
punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised whenever the sovereign has a right
to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers." Id. at 418.
38. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, see. 8, cl. 7.
1996]
5
Coyle: The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992: Federal Cops, Highway Robbers, an
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1996
142 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22:137
gress enacted the predecessor to the Mail Fraud Act,39 known as the
Act of June 8, 1872.40 This statute was upheld as constitutional in
Durland v. United States.4 However, one commentator, a prominent
federal jurist, criticized the statute as "covert legislation" - the use of
a constitutional power as merely "a peg whereon to hang prosecution"
of intrastate fraud in which use of the mails was nominally related, at
best, to the fraudulent scheme and which should be left to the states
for prosecution.4'
C. The Commerce Clause
The power most often used as the basis for federal authority is the
Commerce Clause.43 While the Framers may have viewed the Com-
merce Clause as a modest grant of power,44 surely they could not have
foreseen the vast expansion of its scope over intrastate activities, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.45
1. Gibbons v. Ogden
In Gibbons v. Ogden,46 the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether the State of New York could grant a monopoly over steam-
boat traffic that excluded others from running ferry service on the
39. 18 U.S.C. see. 1341 (1994).
40. 17 Stat. 323 (1872).
41. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
42. "Lawyers will increasingly deal with statutes whose constitutional support bears no sin-
cere relation to the legislative and popular purposes sought to be attained. This is covert legisla-
tion." Charles Merrill Hough, Covert Legislation and the Constitution, 30 HaRv. L. REv. 801,
801 (1917) (the author, who served on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at the time
his article was written, became chief judge in 1926). See Camille Kenny, Federal Criminal Juris-
diction: A Case Against Making Federal Cases, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 574, 580-86 (1984).
43. See supra note 2.
44. One commentator argued that the lack of extensive discussion and debate about the
Commerce Clause at the Constitutional Convention, in the Federalist Papers, and other contem-
porary writings indicates that the Framers saw the Commerce Clause as uncontroversial and
unthreatening to the principals of federalism.
If the power over commerce among the states was intended by the Framers to be an in-
dependent grant of affirmative power over domestic affairs, then there certainly would have
been more conflict over it .... Clearly, commerce was distinct from domestic affairs and the
commerce clause was not perceived to be a broad grant of domestic power.
Greenspan, supra note 3, at 1023-24.
45. Id. at 1021, which states:
The growth of the federal police power based on the commerce clause disrupts the deli-
cately balanced federal system. As federal power expands, state governments are displaced
from their traditional role as the primary authority over individuals. Individuals increas-
ingly are governed by a large federal bureaucracy that is not as accountable, democratic, or
responsive as state and local governments and which cannot provide for local diversity. The
demise of federalism ultimately will threaten individual rights because centralization even-
tually leads to regulation without adequate representation.
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6
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Hudson River between New York and New Jersey.47 In striking down
the New York statute, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on the scope of
the Commerce Clause has become the subject of lengthy debate, with
both sides arguing that it supports their position.
Marshall held that the term "commerce" should not be construed so
strictly' 8 as to exclude "navigation" from its reach.49 "Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse."50 Marshall defined this "commercial in-
tercourse" as something that "cannot stop at the external boundary
line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior."' The
power of Congress to regulate commerce "is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution."52
Marshall's pronouncements have been said to have authorized the
expansion of federal power over intrastate and local activities that ex-
ists today. 3 However, his opinion does include indications to the con-
trary; that the Commerce Clause was not meant to serve as authority
for vast federal police power that would override the limitations of the
Tenth Amendment.5 4 Marshall also said, "[t]he completely internal
commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the
State itself."55 Marshall acknowledged the states' police power-their
authority to pass inspection, quarantine, and health laws, and laws
regulating internal commerce-and ruled that it is included within "a
portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every
47. Id. at 1-3.
48. "This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to
their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why
ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives counte-
nance to this rule?" Id. at 187.
49. "All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to
comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the
constitution was framed." Id. at 190.
50. Id. at 189-90.
51. Id- at 194.
52. Id at 196.
53. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
54. "The Gibbons Court, however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power
are inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. CL
1624, 1627 (1995). See infra notes 205-19 and accompanying text. One commentator argued:
[T]he Tenth Amendment, as an articulation of the principle of a federal government of
limited, enumerated powers, is dependent on the assumption that the Commerce Clause is
not (or will not become) a grant of unlimited power. Indeed, if the commerce power is truly
without limits, then there are no 'powers not delegated to the United States [that must be]
reserved to the States[,]' and the Tenth Amendment is without meaning.
Maloney, supra note 3, at 1802.
55. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
7
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thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the
States themselves."56 The federal government could reach the inter-
nal activities of a state only for "national purposes; it must be where
the power is expressly given for a special purpose, or is clearly inci-
dental to some power which is expressly given.""7
2. Commerce Power During the Nineteenth Century
In Brown v. Maryland5 8 the Court wrestled with the distinction be-
tween the commerce power following Gibbons and the reserved pow-
ers of the states. The Court struck down a Maryland tax on imported
goods as violating the Commerce Clause, but recognized the difficulty
in determining where the federal commerce power ended and the
states' reserved powers began, and to what extent they could be exer-
cised concurrently. Maryland's power of taxation, "and the [Com-
merce Clause] restriction on it, though quite distinguishable when
they do not approach each other, may yet, like the intervening colours
[sic] between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the
understanding, as colours perplex the vision in marking the distinction
between them."159
Regardless of the commerce power's actual scope following Gib-
bons, the Supreme Court initially refused to allow its expansion at the
expense of the states' police power. In United States v. DeWitt,0 the
Court ruled that a federal law 1 regulating the quality of illuminating
oils for sale went beyond the proper scope of the commerce power,
since the statute was a "police regulation" that purported to reach the
internal commerce of the states.62 The Court concluded that its hold-
ing, which recognized the limits of the commerce power over a state's
internal commerce, was self-evident.6 3 Essentially, the Court chas-
tised Congress for attempting to exercise power that the Constitution
56. I& at 203.
57. Id at 203-04.
58. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
59. Id. at 441.
60. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869).
61. Internal Revenue Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 484 (1867).
62. "As a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the States, it can
only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress excludes, territorially, all State legis-
lation, as for example, in the District of Columbia. Within State limits, it can have no constitu-
tional operation." DeWitt, 76 U.S. at 45.
63. "This has been so frequently declared by this court, results so obviously from the terms
of the Constitution, and has been so fully explained and supported on former occasions, that we
think it unnecessary to enter again upon the discussion." Id., citing License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504 (1847); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); and License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 462, 470 (1866).
8
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had reserved to the states by using its own power to preserve the prin-
cipals of federalism.64
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,65 the Court attempted to clarify
the distinction between the federal commerce power and the states'
police power.' The Court defined each power as "exclusive" 67 and
stated:
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the
police power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes
perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while the
one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the
preservation of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual
form of government .... 68
The Court rejected the idea that a manufacturer's intent to ship its
goods interstate was alone sufficient to grant the federal government
jurisdiction; the goods must in fact be "in commerce" before Congress
can regulate the goods or their manufacturer.69 The Court warned
against applying a broader test that would extend national power to
all activities in which the "ultimate result may affect external com-
merce, [because] comparatively little of business operations and af-
fairs would be left for state control. 70
64. In M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 423, Marshall defined the Court's duty as the guardian of fed-
eralism as follows:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the pain-
ful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that
such an act was not the law of the land.
In recent years, the Court has abdicated its responsibility to federalism and left its preservation
to the political process. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text. This is precisely the
result Alexander Hamilton insisted would not occur under the Constitution. See supra note 18.
65. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
66. "That which belongs to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States, but
that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the
State." I& at 12.
67. Id. at 11, which states:
It cannot be denied that the power of a State to protect the lives, health, and property of
its citizens, and to preserve good order and the public morals, 'the power to govern men and
things within the limits of its dominion,' is a power originally and always belonging to the
States, not surrendered by them to the general government, nor directly restrained by the
Constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive .... On the other hand, the
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states is also exclusive. The
Constitution does not provide that interstate commerce shall be free, but, by the grant of
this exclusive power to regulate it, it was left free except as Congress might impose
restraints.
68. Id. at 13.
69. "The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another State does not of itself
make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the manufacturer does not determine
the time when the article or product passes from the control of the State and belongs to com-
merce." Id.
70. Id. at 16.
9
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3. From Commerce Power to Federal Police Power
The police power reserved to the states, as recognized by the
Supreme Court during the nineteenth century, concerned more than
just internal commercial activities:
It is based on the great principle of securing the public safety and in-
volves the protection of the lives, limbs, health and quiet of the per-
son, and the security of property. It is co-extensive with self-
protection; it is the law of overruling necessity, it is inherent in the
State and plenary, and enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort and welfare of society.7
As a result, perhaps, most of the Commerce Clause cases to arise
during that period concerned federal statutes that were clearly com-
mercial in nature.72 The power to enact "criminal" laws was unques-
tionably that of the states, so Congress did not attempt to infiltrate
this area.73 However, during the twentieth century, the federal stat-
utes challenged in the courts began to take on "criminal" characteris-
tics, and the federal police power soon evolved.
In Champion v. Ames,74 the Court addressed the constitutionality of
a federal statute banning the interstate traffic of lottery tickets.75
Although the "widespread pestilence of lotteries" had been criminal-
ized by many states because they were thought to be "an evil of such
appalling character, ' 76 their interstate transport could not be pre-
vented by the states due to the Supreme Court's invention of the
"Dormant" Commerce Clause.77 As a result, the Supreme Court
71. Paul Fuller, Is There a Federal Police Power?, 4 COLuM. L. REv. 563 (1904).
72. "It might be suggested that commerce can only be had in the recognized and admitted
articles of commere ... articles which universal commercial usage recognizes as the subjects of
commerce, and that commerce cannot be predicated of transactions in articles the use of which is
branded as a crime." Id. at 584. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824), in
which Chief Justice Marshall defines "commerce" as "commercial intercourse." Although the
term "intercourse" can be said to broaden the idea of "commerce" to include navigation, the
term "commercial" clearly limits "intercourse" to transactions that are commercial in the com-
mon-usage sense of the term.
73. "The restraint with which the commerce clause has been expounded for over a century
is perhaps the most remarkable example of a certain continuity of thought in the Supreme Court
persisting through generations of men and politics." Hough, supra note 42, at 806.
74. Also known as the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
75. Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963 (1895) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. sec. 1301
(1994)).
76. Champion, 188 U.S. at 357-58.
77. The "Dormant" Commerce Clause prevents the states from erecting any barriers what-
soever to interstate commerce, even in the absence of federal legislation, and was recognized in
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196,204 (1885). In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100
(1890), the Court, in a decision significantly limiting a state's police power, struck down a state
statute prohibiting most liquor sales, including the sale of liquor imported from outside the state.
The Court ruled:
[I]nasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, purchase, sale and ex-
change of commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform
10
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made federal legislation the only available option to effectively con-
trol the sale of lottery tickets.7"
In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the statute and the fed-
eral government's ability to exclude from interstate commerce items
that Congress finds to be "confessedly injurious to the public
morals."79 The Champion decision made significant inroads for the
federal government into an area of the states' police power-the pro-
tection of the public morals-that had been untouched by previous
federal legislation. 0 The Court justified this intrusion into the exclu-
sive realm of the states by reasoning that Congress had intended
merely to assist the states in protecting the morals of their own citi-
zens.8 1 However, the Court cautiously limited its decision to the facts
of that case.8
For a short time, the Court declined to expand federal police power
beyond the exclusion of lottery tickets from interstate commerce.83 In
system, so long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the States to do
so, it thereby indicates its will that such commerce shall be free and untrammelled.
I& at 109-10 (citations omitted).
78. The Court found Congress to be the "only power competent" to prevent one state's
lottery tickets from circumventing another state's ban by using interstate commerce. Champion,
188 U.S. at 357-58. "Thus, regardless of the congressional motive or the broad dicta in the
Champion opinion, the Lottery Act regulated a matter which the Court had put beyond the
power of the states." Baker, supra note 4, at 523-24 (characterizing the wisdom of the Leisy
decision as "debatable"). The Leisy decision, as applied to state police power, appears to have
gone beyond the limits of the Dormant Commerce Clause, as set forth five years earlier in
Gloucester 114 U.S. at 215, which states:
Should such [state] regulations interfere with the commercial power of Congress, they may
at any time be superseded by its action. It was not intended, however, by the grant to
Congress to supersede or interfere with the power of the States to establish police regula-
tions for the better protection and enjoyment of property.
79. Champion, 188 U.S. at 357.
80. "It is the moral foundation that makes this legislation, and the opinion approving it, so
important. Congress was not regulating commerce for the purpose of protecting commercial
transactions but for the purpose of protecting the public morals. No previous case had recog-
nized such a power under the Commerce Clause." Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Fed-
eralization of Crime, 22 AM. Cmm. L. REv. 213, 218 (1984).
81. Champion, 188 U.S. at 357. The dissent argued that lottery tickets are not articles of
commerce, and the mere transportation of non-commercial items across state lines was insuffi-
cient to transform them into commercial items subject to the federal commerce power. Id at 371
(Fuller, CJ., dissenting).
It would be to say that everything is an article of commerce the moment it is taken to be
transported from place to place, and of interstate commerce if from State to State .... It is a
long step in the direction of wiping out all traces of state lines, and the creation of a central-
ized Government.
Id.
82. "The whole subject is too important, and the questions suggested by its consideration
are too difficult of solution, to justify any attempt to lay down a rule for determining in advance
the validity of every statute that may be enacted under the commerce clause." Id. at 363.
83. This judicial restraint did not last long. In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.
Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1916), the Court upheld a federal statute similar to the one at issue in Cham-
pion that banned the interstate transport of intoxicating liquors to states that had banned their
intrastate sale.
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Keller v. United States,' the Court acknowledged the federal govern-
ment's power to enact terms and conditions for the admission of aliens
into the United States,' but refused to grant Congress unlimited au-
thority over the activities of resident aliens and to allow Congress to
crininalize the acts of others who sought to "keep, maintain, control,
support, or harbor in any house or other place, for the purpose of
prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, any alien woman or
girl, within three years after she shall have entered the United
States.... ,86 In overturning the convictions under this federal statute,
the Court stated that the power to protect the public morals was gen-
erally reserved to the states.87 However, the Court recognized that
Congress was poised to intervene in this area and may have the power
to do so under different circumstances. 88
The Court revisited the issue of prostitution five years later, in
Hoke v. United States. 9 Here, the Court upheld the "White Slave
Act,"90 which made it a federal crime for anyone knowingly to trans-
port or assist in transporting a woman or girl in interstate commerce
"for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral
purpose."91 The Court ruled that people can be said to move in inter-
state commerce and thus fall under federal regulation.92 The Court
recognized the existence of a federal police power over interstate
84. 213 U.S. 138 (1908).
85. Congress shall have the power "[tjo establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization ...
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4.
86. Act of Congress of February 20, 1907, see. 3, 34 Stat. 898 (1907).
87. The Court ruled:
While the keeping of a house of ill-fame is offensive to the moral sense, yet that fact must
not close the eye to the question whether the power to punish therefor is delegated to
Congress or is reserved to the States. Jurisdiction over such an offense comes within the
accepted definition of the police power. Speaking generally, that power is reserved to the
States, for there is in the Constitution no grant thereof to Congress.
Keller, 213 U.S. at 144.
88. The Court warned that:
[A]n immense body of legislation, which heretofore has been recognized as peculiarly
within the jurisdiction of the States, may be taken by Congress away from them. Although
Congress has not largely entered into this field of legislation, it may do so, if it has the
power. Then we should be brought face to face with such a change in the internal condi-
tions of this country as was never dreamed of by the framers of the Constitution.
d at 148-49. This change came three years later in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911), which upheld the Pure Food and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). The Court ruled that
Congress could ban impure food and drugs from interstate commerce and could seize them even
after they left "commerce" and came to rest in a particular state. While this case dealt with a
"regulatory" rather than a "criminal" statute, it significantly expanded the federal police power.
89. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
90. Act of Congress of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 825 (1910), also known as the Mann Act.
91. Id. sec. 2. "The effect of regulating persons based on their purposes, i.e., motive or
intent, however, was to create a 'true' crime rather than a regulatory offense." Baker, supra note
4, at 527.
92. "Commerce among the States, we have said, consists of intercourse and traffic between
their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property. There may be, therefore,
12
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commerce, similar to what the states possessed within their borders,
since the states could not criminalize what occurred "among the sev-
eral States."93 The Court further upheld the White Slave Act in Cami-
netti v. United States,94 which held that the language of the statute did
not limit its enforcement to transportation of women for the purpose
of prostitution only, but for "any other immoral purpose," with or
without the expectation of profit.95 Thus, "commercial" interests
were divorced from the notion of "interstate commerce," which could
now be said to criminalize any activity at all that Congress found to
threaten public morals and that crossed state lines.
The Court strayed somewhat from several of its contemporary deci-
sions96 in Hammer v. Dagenhar.97 In this case, the Court struck down
a federal statute that prohibited the interstate transport of goods man-
ufactured in a factory that employed child labor.98 Although the
Court implicitly recognized a federal police power, and with it the
power to exclude from interstate commerce goods that were harmful
to the public health, safety, or morals, it limited this power to goods
that were inherently harmful at the time of interstate shipment. The
Court would not allow Congress to regulate goods that were not in-
a movement of persons as well as property; that is, a person may move or be moved in interstate
commerce." Hoke, 227 U.S. at 320.
Later, the Court upheld federal jurisdiction over kidnapping in Gooch v. United States, 297
U.S. 124 (1936). The Act of May 18,1934,48 Stat. 781 (1934), also known as the Lindbergh Act,
prohibited the interstate transport of a person who had been kidnapped or held for ransom. This
statute made interstate transport a separate element of the offense, but included a rebuttable
presumption that a kidnapping victim has been transported in interstate commerce if not re-
leased within three days. This time period was reduced to 24 hours in 1956. 18 U.S.C. sec.
1201(b) (1994).
93. The Court reasoned:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation having different spheres
of jurisdiction, as we have said, but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the
powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be exer-
cised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral.
Hoke, 227 U.S. at 322. See Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927), which states,
"[W]hen it is necessary in order to prevent an evil to make the law embrace more than the
precise thing to be prevented it may do so."
94. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
95. The Court stated:
While such immoral purpose would be more culpable in morals and attributed to baser
motives if accompanied with the expectation of pecuniary gain, such considerations do not
prevent the lesser offense agtinst morals of furnishing transportation in order that a woman
may be debauched, or become a mistress or a concubine from being the execution of pur-
poses within the meaning of this law.
Id. at 486.
96. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1916) (see supra note
83); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (see supra note 88); Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (see supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text).
97. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
98. Act of September 1, 1916, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
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herently harmful, or goods that may have been manufactured intra-
state under objectionable conditions. 99
Rather than overturn Hammer, the Court sidestepped its limitations
in Brooks v. United States.100 The Court upheld the Dyer Act'01 and
extended the federal government's power to ban interstate shipment
of "contraband," such as stolen automobiles and presumably other
stolen property specified in forthcoming statutes that may or may not
otherwise be regulated under Hammer,1 °2 because of "its harmful re-
sult and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines
against their will are taken into other jurisdictions."'' 3 Although the
stolen cars themselves could not be said to be inherently harmful at
the time of interstate transport, and although the theft that preceded
the transport occurred entirely intrastate, the Court granted Congress
the power to prevent the "misuse" of the channels of interstate com-
merce, similar to that available under Champion, Hoke, and Cami-
netti, to prevent car thieves from escaping capture by fleeing across
state lines with the stolen cars."°
99. The Court ruled:
Over interstate transportation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample,
but the production of articles, intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local regula-
tion .... There is no power vested in Congress to require the States to exercise their police
power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272-73. This appears to be an attempt to reconcile federal police power
with the Court's holding in United States v. B.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895), which limited
the exercise of federal commerce power to only those goods actually "in commerce," regardless
of a manufacturer's intent to later ship them interstate. See supra notes 65-70 and the accompa-
nying text.
But the dissent in Hammer argued, "It does not matter whether the supposed evil precedes or
follows the transportation. It is enough that in the opinion of Congress the transportation en-
courages the evil." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 279-80 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This view was eventu-
ally adopted by the majority of the Court, which later went beyond even its broad sweep. See
infra notes 135-42 and the accompanying text.
100. 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
101. The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 41 Stat. 324 (1919) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. sec. 2312-2313 (1994)).
102. The Court stated:
Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punish-
ing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread
of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin. In doing this it is
merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of inter-
state commerce.
Brooks, 267 U.S. at 436-37.
103. Id. at 439.
104. One commentator stated:
While the Dyer Act did not break any new ground in the development of the jurisdic-
tional authority of the federal government, it proved to be vital in the exercise of that au-
thority. Despite the fact that detection and recovery of stolen vehicles remained
overwhelmingly the province of state and local police, prosecution of those offenses was
virtually completely taken over by the federal government, with Dyer Act cases making up
nearly half of the FBI closed cases for many years.
Bradley, supra note 80, at 225.
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The federal police power, as established by Champion and its prog-
eny, may not have been what the Framers intended when they drafted
the Commerce Clause, but at least it had limits. Congress could pre-
vent the use of interstate commerce for what it found to be immoral
purposes, but only when the person or property crossed state lines,
and only while the "evil" sought to be eradicated was in existence
while the person or property was "in commerce." This arrangement
preserved the states' police power over the local activities of its citi-
zens, since only the states could punish evils that existed before or
after the person or property traveled interstate. The Eighteenth
Amendment, 05 which heralded the era of Prohibition, 0 6 implicitly
recognized these limits, since the Amendment purported to give Con-
gress concurrent power over intrastate activities relating to alcohol
that it otherwise did not have.' 7 But these limits soon disappeared
with the reign of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.0
4. The New Deal
Outraged by the Supreme Court's rejection of many of his New
Deal legislative efforts, President Roosevelt unveiled a plan to reor-
ganize the federal judiciary.1 9 FDR's "court-packing plan," which
would have added six justices-all FDR appointees-to the Supreme
105. U.S. CONsr. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933), ratified on January 16, 1919, states, in rele-
vant part:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exporta-
tion thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
106. Prohibition was repealed on December 5, 1933, by the adoption of the Twenty-First
Amendment. However, this Amendment retained the federal power, first recognized by the
Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1916), to prohibit the
transportation of alcohol into states that have passed their own laws banning alcohol. U.S.
CONsT. amend. XXI, sec. 2.
107. See Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,315 (1926) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 381 (1922)), which states:
Save for some restrictions arising out of the Federal Constitution, chiefly the [dormant]
commerce clause, each State possessed that power in full measure prior to the Amendment,
and the probable purpose of declaring a concurrent power to be in the States was to nega-
tive any possible inference that in vesting the National Government with the power of coun-
try-wide prohibition, state power would be excluded.
(Emphasis added).
108. Roosevelt was inaugurated the 32d president of the United States on March 4, 1933. He
was elected to an unprecedented four terms, and remained in office until his death in April 1945.
His legislative program, and his presidency, was dubbed the "New Deal." SCHEESINGEP, supra
note 1, at 461-62. "In fact, the expansion of federal power under the commerce clause only
began with the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt. During the first century under
the Constitution, Congress rarely attempted to exercise its power over interstate commerce."
Greenspan, supra note 3, at 1022.
109. ScHLEsiNrER, supra note 1, at 472-73.
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Court if any of the justices over seventy years old refused to retire,
was ostensibly designed to improve the Court's efficiency. 110 In fact,
this plan, if passed by Congress, would have given FDR the majority
he needed to overturn Lochner v. New York, 1 ' the largest hurdle in
his drive to centralize control of the Depression-Era economy."12
Although the plan never went into effect, 1 3 the Court got the
message. Less than two months later," 4 in the "switch in time that
saved nine," the Court overruled Adkins v. Children's HospitalP5-a
progeny of Lochner-in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.11 6 With Lochner
called into question and a Court more willing to approve New Deal
legislation, federal power under the Commerce Clause increased
dramatically. 11
7
Before FDR announced his court-packing plan, the Court had at-
tempted to preserve the limits of the "in commerce" rationale justify-
ing federal action. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States," ' the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Live Poultry
Code, promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act," 9
which was intended to ensure "fair competition" in the New York City
live poultry business. 120 The Court found that, although the chickens
to be slaughtered originated largely out of state, the activities in the
slaughterhouse were intrastate and could not be regulated by Con-
gress.' 2 ' The Court ruled that the Code was unconstitutional because
it sought to regulate activity that was beyond the "current" or "flow"
of interstate commerce. 22 The Court asserted that the distinction be-
110. Id.
111. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
112. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 472-73.
U3. In March 1937, Congress passed the Supreme Court Retirement Act, which allowed
justices to retire with full pay at seventy years old. This was passed in an attempt to entice the
older, more conservative justices into retirement, and served as a compromise more acceptable
than the controversial court-packing plan, which alienated many of FDR's allies. Id. at 473.
However, by 1941 Roosevelt managed to appoint a majority of the Supreme Court anyway:
Black replaced Van Devanter, who retired; Reed replaced Sutherland, who retired; Frankfurter
replaced Cardozo, who died; Douglas replaced Brandeis, who retired; Murphy replaced Butler,
who died; Bymes replaced McReynolds, who retired; and Jackson filled the vacancy left when
Stone was promoted to Chief Justice following the retirement of Hughes. Maloney, supra note
3, at 1808 n.82.
114. SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 472-73.
115. 261 U.S. 525 (1922).
116. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
117. "In the course of five years, the Court completely reinterpreted the commerce clause to
allow broad economic regulation." Greenspan, supra note 3, at 1028.
118. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
119. Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. sec. 703,
now omitted).
120. See id. sec. 3.
121. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-43.
122. Id. at 543, which states:
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tween "direct" and "indirect" effects of intrastate transactions on in-
terstate commerce is "a fundamental one, essential to the
maintenance of our constitutional system,"'" and that activities that
have merely an indirect effect on interstate commerce should remain
within the states' police power.'" But only two years later, after the
"switch in time that saved nine," the Court reversed itself on a situa-
tion that was substantially the same as that presented in Schechter. In
National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,125 the
Court addressed the question of whether the federal government,
through one of its agencies, 26 could prevent an employer from engag-
ing in anti-union business practices. While acknowledging the impor-
tance of maintaining the distinction between "national" and "local"
commerce, 27 the Court nevertheless adopted a broad constitutional
test that allowed the federal government to regulate any activity, in-
cluding that which takes place completely intrastate, that "affects
commerce" or has a "close and substantial relationship" with inter-
state commerce.'a This effectively overturned the Court's prior hold-
ings in E. C. Knight'29 and Schechter.130
As the commerce power expanded, so did the federal police power
that depended on it.' 31 In United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op., 32 the
The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a State does not mean
that the flow continues after the property has arrived and has become commingled with the
mass of property within the State and is there held solely for local disposition and use. So
far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased.
123. Id. at 548.
124. Id. at 546, which states:
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could
be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would
embrace practically all the activities of the people and the authority of the State over its
domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government.
125. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
126. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
sec. 151) (1994)). The statute established the National Labor Relations Board and declared that
inequality in bargaining power between corporations and employees, which leads to strikes and
labor unrest, "substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce .... " 29 U.S.C. sec. 151
(1994).
127. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30, 37.
128. "Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be de-
nied the power to exercise that control." Id. at 37.
129. See Maloney, supra note 3, at 1808. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. "The congressional authority to protect
interstate commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and ob-
structions may be due to injurious action springing from other sources." Jones & Laughlin, 301
U.S. at 36.
131. One commentator argued:
When Congress later heavily regulated the economy under the Commerce Clause, and
when the Court fully validated that power in the 1940's, it made possible further expansion
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Court upheld federal police power as defined by Hoke and Cami-
netti.133 But the Court did not stop there-it ruled that when intra-
state transactions were commingled with interstate transactions, the
federal government could regulate both without having to distinguish
between them,134 undermining another aspect of Schechter.35
The commerce power expanded further in United States v. Darby.36
Darby, which expressly overruled Hammer, 37 held that the commerce
power was plenary, 3 8 that it included the police power, 39 and that it
could be exercised to exclude articles from interstate commerce re-
gardless of whether the individual states enacted their own legisla-
tion.140 The Court adopted the "rational relationship" test for
determining the constitutionality of federal statutes that reached in-
trastate activities' 4 ' and stated that the motive for enacting legislation
was irrelevant, even if Congress blatantly used the Commerce Clause
as a mere "constitutional peg" on which to hang regulations that had
little to do with interstate commerce.' 42  Darby held that the Tenth
of national police powers by merging the criminal and non-criminal lines of cases. Federal
auxiliary criminal law could have enlarged to the point of placing most crime within the
potential reach of the federal police power.
Baker, supra note 4, at 518.
132. 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
133. "The authority of the Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ in
extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce." Id. at 569-70.
134. "Activities conducted within state lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the
Commerce Clause. Interstate commerce may be dependent upon them." Id. at 569.
135. See supra note 122.
136. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
137. Id. at 116-17.
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id. at 114.
140. Id. This went beyond the justification for the federal police power first put forth in
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). The Darby Court stated:
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which
may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the com-
merce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be
injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to
regulate their use.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
141. "It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exer-
cise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce." Darby, 312 U.S. at 118. One commentator criticized this approach, stating,
"The rational basis test supports legislation that regulates purely local behavior for the purpose
of promoting or protecting the public health, welfare, or morality .... Not only has the com-
merce clause become the source of federal police power, it has become an unlimited source."
Greenspan, supra note 3, at 1020-21.
142. Darby 312 U.S. at 115. "In other words, under Darby, Congress could regulate intra-
state work conditions as a means of enforcing its 'permitted end' of prohibiting the interstate
transport of the products of such work conditions." Maloney, supra note 3, at 1810. See supra
notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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Amendment was a mere "truism" that would no longer serve as a bar
to the growth of federal power.143
In Wickard v. Filburn,144 the Court decided whether wheat produc-
tion quotas' 45 were constitutional when applied to wheat that the
farmer had no intention of selling but planned to grow for only him-
self and his family. The Court surpassed the limits of its previous hold-
ing in Jones & Laughlin, which gave the federal government power
over intrastate activities only when they had a "close and substantial
relationship" with interstate commerce. 46 The Court found that,
although the amount of wheat in question was trivial, its potential ef-
fects on interstate commerce were substantial when considered in the
aggregate with all other farmers similarly situated. 47 It made no dif-
ference that the wheat subject to regulation would never enter the
stream of commerce, since it would compete with wheat that the
farmer otherwise would have purchased at market for his family, and,
therefore, it would have a "negative" effect on interstate commerce. 4
The Court expressly rejected the distinction between "direct" and "in-
direct" effects on interstate commerce, emphasized in Schechter, stat-
ing that "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce... ."149
The Wickard Court relied on Gibbons to justify the vast expansion
in federal power that resulted from this decision.' 50 The Court argued
that, in overturning the narrow interpretation of the Commerce
Clause that had persisted throughout most of the nineteenth and into
the early twentieth century, it was in fact returning to the original,
143. Compare the Court's view of the Tenth Amendment in Darby with that expressed 34
years earlier in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 90-91 (1907), which stated that the passage of
the Tenth Amendment
disclosed the widespread fear that the National Government might, under the pressure of a
supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted .... This
Article X is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to
be construed fairly and liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning.
144. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
145. These quotas were established by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 31
(1938) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. sec. 1281 (1994) et seq.), and were intended to stabilize
the price of wheat by controlling the amount grown and made available for market. See 7 U.S.C.
sec. 1301 (1994).
146. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
147. "That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127-28.
148. "Home-grown wheat is this sense competes with wheat in commerce." Id. at 128.
149. Id. at 125. This completed the dismantling of the holding in Schechter, which had been
handed down only eight years earlier.
150. Id. at 120.
1996]
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expansive definition of the commerce power articulated by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall. 5 ' The Court went on to state that Congress had not yet
even come close to reaching the limits of Marshall's vision of the com-
merce power. 152 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court ig-
nored the Framers' intent 53 and Marshall's own expressed limitations
on this power.' 54 The resulting demise of federalism is the legacy of
the New Deal.' 55
5. Modem Federal Police Power
Because of the expansion of the commerce power during the New
Deal, the federal police power continued to grow'56 and gain a certain
legitimacy. 57 However, even after the New Deal, the extent of the
federal police power over criminal matters, as opposed to the expan-
sive power to regulate commerce, remained in doubt. Generally, fed-
eral criminal statutes based on the commerce power were required to
possess a "nexus" to interstate commerce that was somewhat stronger
than that of the "affects commerce" rationale of Darby.158
In Tot v. United States,159 the Court addressed the constitutionality
of the Federal Firearms Act,160 which prohibited convicted felons
from receiving guns and ammunition that had been transported in in-
terstate commerce. This statute contained a presumption that if the
federal prosecutor could prove a prior conviction for a crime of vio-
lence and present possession, the jury could presume that the gun or
ammunition was received in interstate commerce after the effective
date of the statute.' 6 '
151. "Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written,
however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to
supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief
Justice Marshall ..... Id. at 122.
152. "At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a
breadth never yet exceeded." Id at 120.
153. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
155. "Thus, as part of the belief of the time that the solution to the nation's problems could
come from Washington, a 'new deal' in criminal law enforcement began." Bradley, supra note
80, at 232.
156. "As already indicated, development of national police powers through the Commerce
Clause has in large part resulted from not distinguishing between crimes and regulatory offenses
and from disconnecting the jurisdictional and criminal elements." Baker, supra note 4, at 538.
157. The Act of June 5, 1948, 62 Stat. 686 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. sec. 10
(1994)) amended the statutory definition of "interstate commerce" by replacing the term "trans-
portation" with "commerce," thereby adopting the broader connotation of the latter term to
reflect the New Deal case law on the subject.
158. Chippendale, supra note 4, at 460; Maloney, supra note 3, at 1811.
159. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
160. 52 Stat. 1250-1251 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. sec. 902(f) (1994)).
161. Id See Tot, 319 U.S. at 466.
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First, the Court pointed out that both of the courts below and the
government agreed that enforcement of the statute was limited to re-
ceipt of the prohibited items as a part of interstate transportation "and
does not extend to the receipt, in an intrastate transaction, of such
articles which, at some prior time, have been transported inter-
state."' 62 Next, the Court struck down the presumption of interstate
transport as violative of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 63 The resulting statute could reach fire-
arms possession by felons only when the government could prove the
required nexus to interstate commerce-that the felon received the
contraband as part of an interstate transaction.
In United States v. Five Gambling Devices," the Court, in a plural-
ity opinion, affirmed the dismissal of indictments under a federal stat-
ute' 65 that banned the shipment of gambling machines in interstate
commerce and required the reporting of sales and deliveries to the
Attorney General. The Court pointed to the government's failure to
allege that the gambling machines had moved in interstate com-
merce,166 thereby making this fact an element of the offense necessary
to find nexus, and read the prohibition and reporting requirements to
apply to interstate transactions only, rather than striking down the
statute in its entirety. 67 The dissent applied the Darby "affects
commerce" rationale and found no need to read the statute
restrictively.168
Apparently, the dissent's view in Five Gambling Devices began to
take hold by the next decade in two cases resulting from the passage
162. Tot, 319 U.S. at 466.
163. "Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no ra-
tional connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the
one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in com-
mon experience." Ld. at 467-68. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V & XIV.
164. 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
165. Act of January 2, 1951, 64 Stat. 1134 (1951) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. secs.
1171-1177 (1994)).
166. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 442.
167. Ld. at 448-49, which states:
This is not because we would avoid or postpone difficult decisions. The predominant con-
sideration is that we should be sure Congress has intentionally put its power in issue by the
legislation in question before we undertake a pronouncement which may have far-reaching
consequences upon the powers of the Congress or the powers reserved to the several states.
However, one commentator argued that the reporting requirement, as applied to both intrastate
and interstate transactions, should have been upheld because it would have facilitated effective
enforcement of the interstate transport ban by helping the government weed out intrastate trans-
actions. Stern, supra note 4, at 275-76. "Certainly, the relationship of the reporting require-
ment, even for intrastate transactions, to the enforcement of the substantive interstate
prohibition was closer than the effect upon interstate commerce of the substantive prohibition of
completely intrastate transactions in the more recent loan shark and firearms statutes to be dis-
cussed." Id. at 276.
168. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. at 460 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.169 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States,170 the Court upheld the commerce-based statute by ap-
plying Darby's "rational relationship" test,'7 1 even though the Court
admitted that the statute had criminal characteristics and was founded
on the police power. 7' In Katzenbach v. McClung,173 the Court ruled
that the federal government can criminalize local activities that have a
"close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce, adopting the
Jones & Laughlin test.'74 The Court also adopted the Wickard test.
This test established that individual conduct may be criminalized, even
though its own impact on interstate commerce is trivial, when its im-
pact is considered in the aggregate with all others similarly situated
and is found to be substantial."5 These cases eliminated the distinc-
tion between regulatory and criminal statutes under the Commerce
Clause and resulted in the establishment of a general federal police
power with the potential to encompass all local crime.' 7 6 Some com-
mentators have suggested that, rather than ensuring this result under
the Commerce Clause, the Civil Rights Act could have accomplished
its purpose more effectively without the resulting damage to federal-
ism if it had been based on the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 77
The Court went even further in Perez v. United States.178 In Perez,
the Court upheld the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 79 which
criminalized all acts of "loan sharking" by declaring that, due to the
influence of organized crime, loan sharks affect interstate com-
merce.'8 0 The Court examined Darby and concluded that its holding
authorized Congress to criminalize intrastate behavior that, as a
"class," affected interstate commerce without requiring proof that the
169. 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000a (1994)).
170. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
171. Id. at 258-59. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
172. "It was this burden [racial discrimination] which empowered Congress to enact appro-
priate legislation and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted
by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was
also deemed a moral and social wrong." Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257.
173. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
174. Id. at 297. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
175. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
176. See infra note 200.
177. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONsT., amend XIV, ci. 5. "A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment
would have a more settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a particular res-
taurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of the Act or whether a particular customer is
an interstate traveler." Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring).
178. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
179. 82 Stat. 159 (1964) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. see. 891 (1994)).
180. "Extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Con-
gress affect interstate commerce." Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
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defendant's particular acts had any effect on interstate commerce. 181
This ended the necessity, found under Tot and Five Gambling Devices,
for federal prosecutors to prove federal jurisdiction as a separate ele-
ment of the offense.1 8a The dissent criticized the majority opinion for
opening the door to the federalization of all crime, whether interstate
or intrastate, since no proof of the impact on interstate commerce
would be required 183 and no logical distinction could be made be-
tween loan sharking and any other crime.' 8"
In light of contemporary decisions, the Court revisited the statute at
issue in Tot,'85 which had been amended'8 6 to punish a convicted felon
who "receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting com-
merce" any firearm. 8 7 In United States v. Bass,88 the Court used this
statute's ambiguityw 8 9 as a reason to read it narrowly and require the
government to prove that the firearm had been possessed "in com-
merce or affecting commerce."'19 The Court reserved decision on
whether Congress, upon appropriate findings, could ban the "mere"
intrastate possession of firearms by felons under Perez.'91
181. Id. at 152. "The Supreme Court decision sustaining Perez's conviction did not point to
any interstate element in the particular transaction, to any interstate effect it might have had or,
indeed, to Perez being associated with 'organized crime."' Stem, supra note 4, at 276. "Thus,
the statute upon which the prosecution in Perez was based represents an unprecedented exten-
sion of federal power in the area of criminal justice." Patricia A. Hair, Commerce Clause-
National Police Power Justified by Economic Impact of Organized Crime, 46 TuL L. REv. 829,
832 (1972).
182. Federal jurisdiction must still be proved when the statute in question expressly lists
jurisdiction as a separate element of the offense, such as kidnapping. See supra note 92.
183. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
184. Justice Stewart argued:
But it is not enough to say that loansharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national
problem. It is not enough to say that some loan-sharking has interstate characteristics, for
any crime may have an interstate setting. And the circumstance that loansharking has an
adverse impact on interstate business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business
suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets.
Id. at 157-58.
185. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
186. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-315, 82 Stat.197
(1968), codified this provision at 18 U.S.C. secs. 1201-1203 and replaced the original version that
existed under the Federal Firearms Act, which was codified at 15 U.S.C. secs. 902(e)-(f), repealed
by Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-308, sec. 104, 100 Stat. 459 (1986).
187. 18 U.S.C. sec. 1202(a) (emphasis added) (repealed 1986).
188. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
189. "[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have signifi-
cantly changed the federal-state balance." Id. at 349.
190. "Given this ambiguity, we adopt the narrower reading: the phrase 'in commerce or af-
fecting commerce' is part of all three offenses, and the present conviction must be set aside
because the Government has failed to show the requisite nexus with interstate commerce." Id.
at 347.
191. Id. at 339 n.4.
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However, Bass and Tot were effectively overruled in Barrett v.
United States,1' which held that Congress had clearly intended the
revised statute to apply to any firearm that, at one time, had moved in
interstate commerce, and did not intend to limit the statute to fire-
arms received as part of the interstate transaction. 93 A concurring
opinion distinguished Tot by stating that the presumption of interstate
transport, 94 which was struck down in Tot and was not included in the
revised statute at issue in Barrett, necessarily implied that the statute,
as originally written, was unable to reach receipts that were not them-
selves part of the interstate transaction. 95 Since the revised statute
did not rely on a presumption of interstate transport, its broad lan-
guage, although similar to the original, could be said to have the wid-
est possible reach.196 In Scarborough v. United States,197 the Court put
to rest any doubt that "Congress sought to reach possessions broadly,
_11,198
with little concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred.
In fact, in Scarborough, the Court dismissed the idea that once a fire-
arm had moved in interstate commerce, it could ever be said to leave
the "stream of commerce" and come to rest in a state.199
Since the merger of the regulatory and criminal lines of Commerce
Clause cases, it is difficult to say if there are any limits at all on the
federal government's ability to criminalize local activity.2°° In Russell
192. 423 U.S. 212 (1976).
193. "Thus, there is no warping or stretching of language when the statute is applied to a
firearm that already has completed its interstate journey and has come to rest in the dealer's
showcase at the time of its purchase and receipt by the felon." Ild. at 217.
194. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
195. Barrett, 423 U.S. at 226 (white, J., concurring).
196. Id.
197. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
198. Id. at 577.
199. "[W]e see no indication that Congress intended to require any more than the minimal
nexus that the firearms have been, at some time, in interstate commerce." Id. at 575.
200. Subsequent cases have expanded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
significantly. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981), and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), the Court announced its intention to defer to
Congress on this issue, stating, "A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regu-
lated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the
regulatory means selected and the asserted ends." Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. at 323-24 (empha-
sis added). However, in a concurring opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist argued, "Nor is it suffi-
cient that the person or activity reached have some nexus with interstate commerce. Our cases
have consistently held that the regulated activity must have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 310-11 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
judgment) (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court overturned
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had overturned Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), and held that state governments were not exempt from federal labor
regulations due to some concept of state sovereignty. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-67. After Garcia,
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v. United States,2" 1 the Court upheld the conviction of the owner of an
apartment building under a federal statute prohibiting arson,2° stat-
ing, "The reference to 'any building... used... in any activity affect-
ing interstate or foreign commerce' expresses an intent by Congress to
exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause. '20 3 Although the
Court recognized that this statute may not apply to arson committed
against a private home, the Court concluded that the rental of real
estate is a "class" of activities that Congress may reasonably conclude
affects interstate commerce without having to specify "the connection
between the market for residential units and 'the interstate movement
of people' .. 0. .4
6. The Rebirth of Federalism?
While the power of Congress to criminalize local activity under the
guise of commercial regulation may be broad, it is not unlimited, and
the Supreme Court may again be ready to find and vigorously enforce
its limits.20 5 In United States v. Lopez,2° the Court, in a five-to-four
decision, struck down a commerce-based criminal statute for the first
time since the New Deal.20 7
In March 1992, Alfonso Lopez Jr., a teenager from San Antonio,
Texas, brought a pistol to school and was arrested and charged with
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,18 resulting in the
dismissal of similar state charges.20 9 The Court found that there are
federalism concerns would find their only voice in the "national political process," as the Court
would no longer act in this regard. I& at 554.
201. 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
202. 18 U.S.C. sec. 844(i) (1994).
203. Russell, 471 U.S. at 859 (quoting 18 U.S.C. sec. 844(i) (1994)).
204. Id. at 862.
205. Richard J. Lazarus, a law professor at Washington University, said, "The commerce
clause has been a no-brainer for years .... As long as you could imagine some connection to
interstate commerce, the court would uphold it. Now the court is saying there's a limit." Wil-
liam H. Freivogel, High Court Puts Breaks on Congress, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH, Apr. 27,
1995, at Al.
206. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The question of "mere" intrastate gun possession had been left
open by United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 n.4 (1971).
207. Lopez vs. the State, WASH TmEs, Apr. 29, 1995, at A14. Laurence Tribe, a noted
Harvard University professor of constitutional law, commented that "if ever there was an act
that exceed Congress's commerce power, this was it." Id
208. 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(q)(1)(A)(1988 Supp. V) prohibits "any individual knowingly to pos-
sess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone." The term "school zone" is defined as "in, or on the grounds of," or "within a distance of
1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." Id. sec. 921(a)(25). "The
Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be
connected in any way to interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
209. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. sec. 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994). "When Congress criminalizes
conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a change in the sensitive relation
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3, quoting United
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three contexts in which Congress can regulate under the Commerce
Clause: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce; ' '210 (2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activities; '211 and (3) "activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce... i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. '212 The Court noted that the third context gov-
erned the statute at issue and stated, "Within this final category, ad-
mittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must
'affect' or 'substantially affect' interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause. '213
The Court concluded that "the proper test requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate com-
merce." 214  In doing so, the Court revived the distinction between
commercial regulation and criminal law under the Commerce
Clause.215 Although Congress retained vast power to regulate eco-
nomic activity,216 its power to regulate non-economic activity through
the use of criminal statutes would be restricted to those activities sub-
States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973), and Bass, 404 U.S. at 349 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
210. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,114 (1941); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
211. Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20 (1911); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
212. Id. at 1629-30 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)).
213. Id. at 1630.
214. Id.
215. "Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." Id. at 1630-
31. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
While the majority agreed that the criminal statute in question went beyond congressional
power, the justices had differing views on the proper scope of the commerce power over eco-
nomic activities. In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated, "Stare decisis oper-
ates with great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place
respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature." Lopez, 115
S. Ct. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, Justice Clarence Thomas advocated going
even further by abandoning the position that allows Congress to regulate activities that have
only an indirect effect on interstate commerce, and returning to the limited scope of the com-
merce power envisioned by the Framers and existing prior to the New Deal. "I am aware of no
cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as
sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the
substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century." Id. at 1648 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
216. "Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a
gun in a school zone does not." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
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stantially affecting interstate commerce.217 The "substantially affects"
test of Lopez threatens the holdings in Katzenbach in part, and Perez
and its progeny, and purports to reinforce the limits of the federal
police power found under Jones & Laughlin."' It is uncertain, how-
ever, whether Lopez is the beginning of the restoration of federalism
or merely a speed bump in the race for federal domination."1 9
217. The statute "cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1631.
218. "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 1634. This
position has been advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion in
Lopez, at least since his concurrence in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining in 1981. See supra note
200.
219. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, a law professor at the University of Tennessee, said the Lopez
decision "is quite possibly the most important decision of the decade in how the country does
business. It could mean a drastic reordering of roles of federal government and states." Lopez
vs. the State, supra note 207, at A14. One editorial argued:
[T]he major import of the ruling in Lopez is its reversal of a 60-year trend in the interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause in favor of expanded federal power over economic as well as
social life. The coalition on the court that issued the ruling may thus be a harbinger that the
court is beginning to reverse that trend, and if so, supporters of less government regulation
and more state and local autonomy have good reason to hail the ruling in Lopez.
Id. But see Federalism and Guns in School, wAsH. Posr, Apr. 28, 1995, at A26, an opposing
editorial that stated, "The Lopez opinion is limited to this single law, and there is no reason to
assume it foreshadows a fundamental restructuring of federal-state relations." Sen. Herb Kohl
of Wisconsin, the author of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, dismissed Lopez as "a piece
of judicial activism that ignores children's safety for the sake of legal nit-picking." Id.
Several lower federal courts apparently have refused to follow the Supreme Court's lead and
have distinguished Lopez from cases they have decided since the Lopez decision was handed
down. See United State v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir. 1995) (upheld conviction under 18
U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1) (1994) for possession of ammunition by prior convicted felon, despite Lo-
pez, when "component parts" of ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce before manu-
facturing process, even though completed ammunition had not); United States v. W'lks, 58 F.3d
1518,1521 (10th Cir. 1995) (upheld conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(o) (1994) for "possession
or transfer" of machineguns by distinguishing "mere possession," found to be non-commercial
under Lopez, from "transfer," a commercial activity); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 &
n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (upheld penalties under 18 U.S.C. sec. 248 (1994) for blocking access to
abortion clinic because of congressional findings that providing abortions is commercial activity,
even though blocking access is not); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir.
1995) (upheld conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1) (1994) because statute contains jurisdic-
tional element requiring that prosecution prove firearm had "been, at some time, in interstate
commerce," unlike the statute at issue in Lopez); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp.
568 (D. Kan. 1995) (upheld conviction under 21 U.S.C. sec. 860, the "Drug-Free School Zones
Act," even though statute had same constitutional infirmities as statute in Lopez, because
"[d]rug trafficking is inherently commercial in nature; firearm possession is not"); United States
v. Campbell, 891 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (upheld conviction under 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1)
(1994) because of jurisdictional element, but suggested that result might have been different if
Lopez had expressly overturned Scarborough).
President Bill Clinton has already begun to seek proposals to amend the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. By adding the requirement that the government prove that the firearm "moved in or
the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce," Clinton be-
lieves that Lopez will be satisfied. Letter from the President to Congress Regarding Gun Free
Schools, U.S. NEwswmE, May 10, 1995, available in WL, ALLNEWS. "Meanwhile, members of
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANn CAR THEFTr Acr
OF 1992
A. Provisions of the Statute
The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 (the "Act")1 0 is divided into four
titles. Title I enhances law enforcement efforts against auto theft. Title
II concerns automobile title fraud. Title I targets the activities of
"chop shops" and the resale of stolen parts. Title IV seeks to prevent
the export of stolen vehicles.2 1
The Act's more controversial provisions are contained in Title I.
First, the Act creates the new federal crime of carjacking3. 3 The Act
states:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in inter-
state or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years,
or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title)
results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any
number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.224
Congress would do well to pause and consider, before they pass additional laws that would make
more crimes federal offenses, even though state statutes already apply." Lawmaking Zeal
Supreme Court Tightens Leash on Congress, COLLMBus DISPATCJH, May 9, 1995, at 6A.
220. Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "ACTA" or "Act"].
221. For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the Act, see Wing, supra note 9.
222. Other sections include provisions for awarding grants to state and local law enforce-
ment, secs. 130-133; establishing a federal task force to study problems associated with vehicle
titling and registration, see. 140; and randomly inspecting vehicles and containers that may con-
tain vehicles scheduled for shipment overseas, secs. 401-402. These sections are not very contro-
versial, since they address arguably commercial, as opposed to criminal, matters and discussion
of them is beyond the scope of this Note.
223. ACTA sec. 101 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119 (1994)).
224. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119 (1994). As originally enacted, sec. 2119 applied only when the
caijacker possessed a firearm at the time of the cajacking, and did not include the death penalty
as an option for punishment. Ironically, although the Basu incident served as the impetus be-
hind the Act's passage, the carjackers involved could not have been convicted under the Act's
original provisions since they had not possessed firearms during the incident. See supra notes
13-17 and accompanying text.
Under the original language of the Act, the question of double jeopardy arose, since a
carijacker could potentially receive sentences under both sec. 2119 and sec. 924(c), which man-
dates the additional sentence of five years if a person uses or carries a firearm during the com-
mission of any crime of violence. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932), the
Court found that multiple punishments for the same criminal offense violated the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
Several courts have applied the "Blockburger Test," which states, "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
28
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Next, the Act increases the penalties for the existing crimes of im-
portation, exportation,' and interstate transportation of automobiles
known to be stolen =6 The Act subjects to civil and criminal forfeiture
"[a]ny property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to
the gross proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly," from violating the
Act's criminal provisions that prohibit carjacking, importing, export-
ing, possessing, or selling stolen vehicles, and altering or removing ve-
hicle identification numbers 227 The Act also defines the term "chop
shop" and makes it a federal crime to own or operate one.2
determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not." These courts reached different conclusions,
although the majority of courts found no violation of Blockburger. For a more detailed discus-
sion of this issue in relation to ACTA, see Mary C. Michenfelder, The Federal Carfacking Statute:
To Be or Not To Be? An Analysis of the Propriety of U.S.C. 2119,39 ST. Louis L. 1009 (1995).
The cases that allowed multiple sentences are: United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moham-
med, 27 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Robertson, 861 F. Supp. 1031
(W.D. Okla. 1994); United States v. Grant, 860 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Ga. 1994); United States v.
Stokes 858 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1994); United States v. Hemandez, 849 F. Supp. 150 (D.P.R.
1994); United States v. Payne, 841 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Ohio 1994); United States v. Harwood, 834
F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Ky. 1993); United States v. McHenry, 830 F. Supp. 1020 (N.D. Ohio 1993);
United States v. Zukinta, 830 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1993). The cases that would not allow
multiple sentences due to the Double Jeopardy Clause are: United States v. Torres, 857 F. Supp.
168 (D.P.R. 1994); United States v. Moore, 832 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Ala. 1993); United States v.
Smith, 831 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1993).
This question was rendered moot with the enactment of Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, sec.
60003(a) (14), 108 Stat. 1970 (1994). However, the effects of the amendment, which now limit sec.
2119 to those carijackers that the prosecutor can prove had the "intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm," have yet to be seen. See Martinez, 49 F.3d at 1401, which states that sec. 2119, as
originally enacted, was a general intent crime that precluded the defense of diminished capacity.
It has not been determined if this defense would be available under the amended section.
225. ACTA, Title I, sec. 102, 106 Stat. at 3385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. sec. 553(a)
(1994)).
226. Id. sec. 103 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. secs. 2312-2313 (1994)).
227. Id. see. 104 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. secs. 981-982 (1994)). Civil forfeiture, in
itself, has created much controversy because of its lower standard of proof for seizure and be-
cause the burden is on the property owner to prove that no ill-gotten gains were used in purchas-
ing the forfeited property. Since this is a topic that deserves thorough examination, and since its
operation under the Act is no different than under other federal statutes, discussion of this sec-
tion is beyond the scope of this Note.
228. Id. sec. 105, 106 Stat. at 3385-86 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. see. 2322 (1994)).
"Chop shop" is defined as:
[A]ny building, lot, facility, or other structure or premise where one or more persons engage
in receiving, concealing, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any
passenger motor vehicle or passenger motor vehicle part which has been unlawfully ob-
tained in order to alter, counterfeit, deface, destroy, disguise, falsify, forge, obliterate, or
remove the identity, including the vehicle identification number or derivative thereof, of
such vehicle or vehicle part and to distribute, sell, or dispose of such vehicle or vehicle part
in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. sec. 2322(b) (1994).
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B. Interstate Transport of Stolen Automobiles
In assessing the constitutionality of the criminal provisions of the
Act, the most logical place to begin would be section 103, which pro-
hibits the interstate transport of vehicles known to be stolen 2 9 and
punishes anyone who "receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or dis-
poses of any motor vehicle... moving as, or which is a part of, or
which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same
to have been stolen." 30 The Dyer Act, which originally enacted the
criminal provisions found in section 103,231 was upheld long ago in
Brooks.232 That case extended the reasoning in Champion2 3 to allow
Congress to prohibit the "misuse" of the channels of interstate com-
merce by transporting "contraband" such as stolen automobiles.2 34
The power exerted by section 103 represented the federal police
power in its infancy, which posed little threat to the constitutional bal-
ance of power between the federal and state governments, both then
and now. Its application was limited, by its terms and judicial interpre-
tation, to those who had actually transported the stolen vehicle across
state lines235 or who had done something with the vehicle while it was
still "in commerce. '236 Federal jurisdiction is justified over the stolen
vehicles interstate journey because "[n]either state is able to protect it
229. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2312 (1994).
230. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2313 (1994).
231. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
232. 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
233. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
234. Brooks, 267 U.S. at 438-39.
235. Hostetter v. United States, 16 F.2d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 1926) (contention that car taken
across state lines under its own power, rather than by freight train, is not interstate commerce is
"utterly unsound"); whitaker v. United States, 5 F.2d 546,548 (9th Cir. 1925) ("There can be no
question but that the driving of a stolen automobile from one state to another on its own power
is in itself interstate commerce notwithstanding that it carries no freight or passengers for hire.");
United States v. Winkler, 299 F. 832, 833 (W.D. Tex. 1924) (crossing state lines is interstate
commerce).
236. Cox v. United States, 96 F.2d 41,43 (8th Cir. 1938) ("Unless the stolen automobile had
moved and was still moving in interstate commerce when it was sold, the sale was not a federal
offense and the court below was without jurisdiction to deal with it."); Levi v. United States, 71
F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir. 1934) ("An article once placed in interstate commerce continues therein
at least until it reaches the point of destination."); McNally v. Hill, 69 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1934),
which states:
[B]y the two sections, the statute forbids and punishes the transportation and sale of a sto-
len motor vehicle in interstate commerce from its inception by theft to its termination by
sale, yet even in the sale clause... the transaction must, of course, partake of or have the
characteristic of interstate commerce as a necessary judicial ingredient....
The Congress intended a sale of a stolen motor vehicle which, having been unlawfully
moved in interstate commerce and coming to rest, continues so closely related to that com-
merce as to remain "a part of" it.
Id. at 40 (citations omitted). These cases necessarily imply that an automobile once transported
interstate does not forever retain the characteristic of interstate commerce, but at some point
"comes to rest" in a state when it is no longer "closely related" to commerce. See Baugh v.
United States, 27 F.2d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 1928).
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during the whole period of its transportation, and this fact makes fed-
eral control particularly necessary, as well as legally possible." 7
C. Owning or Operating a Chop Shop
Section 105, which criminalizes the ownership or operation of a
chop shop, is somewhat more difficult to justify. It is unclear whether
or not this section is an attempt by Congress to assert its power under
the Commerce Clause to its fullest extent as recognized by the
Supreme Court. Although it is unlikely that Congress intended to ex-
clude from federal jurisdiction owners and operators of chop shops
who distribute their ill-gotten wares exclusively intrastate, the terms
of this section purport to do just that. The definition of "chop shop" is
limited to facilities that "distribute, sell, or dispose of such vehicle or
vehicle part in interstate or foreign commerce. '238  The phrase "in
commerce" is a term of art the Court has found to be much narrower
in scope than the phrase "affects commerce," and Congress is pre-
sumed to know this distinction.3 9 Under Five Gambling Devices240
and Bass,2 41 then, this ambiguity would lead the Court to assume that
Congress did not intend to put its power at issue and, therefore, to
adopt the narrower reading of the section. Thus, federal prosecutors
may be required to allege and prove the interstate commerce nexus,
thereby restraining federal power somewhat over local activities.
However, if the Court found that such a narrow reading was con-
trary to the obvious intent of Congress,.'2 the constitutionality of this
section would depend heavily on Perez. In Perez, the Court upheld a
federal statute that criminalized a "class" of activity because of find-
ings that the class affected interstate commerce, without having to
prove the effects of individual acts that fell within the class.2 43 These
237. Yohn v. United States, 280 F. 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1922).
238. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2322(b) (1994) (emphasis added). In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995), the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a commerce-based criminal
statute, in part because it lacked a "jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-
case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1631.
The jurisdictional element provided by ACIA sec. 103, if interpreted narrowly, would presuma-
bly satisfy this requirement.
239. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279-81 (1975).
240. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
242. "Enterprises using all three profiteering methods regularly engage in interstate, and
even international, trafficking of automobiles and auto parts. Just as important, auto thieves
have a severe and deleterious effect on interstate commerce by imposing significant costs on auto-
mobile owners." H.R. REP. No. 102-851(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 14-15 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2831 (emphasis added).
243. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
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findings were based on the alleged influence of organized crime on the
class of activity at issue.2"
Many of the criminal statutes adopted by Congress, beginning with
the Lottery Act and continuing to the present day, target activities
that generally are considered to be under the control of organized
crime.245 To many, this connection alone justifies federal involve-
ment, since criminal organizations often operate interstate, and even
internationally. 46 But not only is there no precise definition of organ-
ized crime,24 7 Perez's reliance on the supposed interstate character of
organized crime to justify the criminalization of classes of activities,
such as those allegedly controlled by organized crime, is an act of cir-
cular reasoning.248
A challenge of section 105, if this section is given its broadest possi-
ble interpretation, would necessarily include a challenge of the
Court's extension of federal authority over classes of criminal activity,
set forth in Perez. Although "[t]he overruling of a case... should not
be lightly undertaken," 249 there is authority supporting "the proposi-
tion that important decisions of constitutional law are not subject to
the same command of stare decisis as are decisions of statutory ques-
tions. '250 Although the Court in Lopez did not expressly overrule
244. "Organized crime is interstate and international in character .... A substantial part of
the income of organized crime is generated by extortionate credit transactions .... Even when
extortionate credit transactions are purely interstate in character, they nevertheless directly af-
fect interstate and foreign commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147 n.1 (quoting
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title II, sec. 201(a), 82 Stat. 159 (1964)).
245. "The threat of organized crime as a basis for the growth of federal power has been a
particularly enduring phenomenon.". Bradley, supra note 80, at 215.
246. One commentator argued:
[T]he economic characteristics of organized crime require law enforcement tools above and
beyond those adequate for the apprehension and conviction of ordinary criminals. Since
Congress has the power to control legitimate businesses involved in interstate commerce,
illegitimate businesses organized upon the same national basis should not go uncontrolled
due to the inability of local law enforcement agencies to work on a national scale.
Hair, supra note 181, at 835. See supra note 244.
247. "Activity labeled as 'organized crime' has become almost indistinguishable from ordi-
nary crime and from even some organized noncriminal activity. As a result, the role of federal
law enforcement has expanded much more so than many realize." Baker, supra note 4, at 497.
248. See supra note 239. One commentator concluded:
Consequently, the statute did not require, as all previous statutes had, that a particular
transaction specifically involve interstate commerce at all, because loan-sharking now af-
fected interstate commerce by definition .... But unlike past legislation where the govern-
ment's claim was that the national character of the criminal enterprise made local
enforcement impossible, the peculiarly local nature of loan-sharking led to a statute where
the interstate connection need not (because it generally could not) be proven.
Bradley, supra note 80, at 252.
249. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
250. lId, citing The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, CJ., dissent-
ing); Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,590-91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936) (Stone and Cardozo, J.J., concurring)
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Perez, it sufficiently undermined the reasoning in Perez to leave it
open to constitutional challenge. In the interests of federalism, a prin-
ciple central to the Constitution and necessary for the prevention of
tyranny, Perez should be overruled, and section 105, if given its
broadest possible interpretation, should be struck down.
D. Carjacking
In an attempt to avoid constitutional infirmities,251 the drafters of
section 101 of the Act expressly limited its application to carjackers
who steal cars that have been "transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce."' 2 Although this limitation provides
the theoretical possibility that a carjacker could escape federal prose-
cution because the car he stole had never crossed state lines, in fact,
the limitation is virtually meaningless since almost every car on the
road today has crossed state lines at some point, and if not, the owner
could avail himself of federal protection simply by heading for the
nearest state boundary after purchase.2 53 Despite the farcical way this
section attempts to placate concerns for federalism, it has been upheld
("The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a
limited application in the field of constitutional law.").
251. "There is little doubt that Congress' choice to exclude the theft of intrastate cars from
the sweep of the statute was based on congressional concern that failure to do so would render
the statute constitutionally flawed." United States v. Watson, 815 F. Supp. 827, 833 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (emphasis in original).
252. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2119 (1994). "[IThe stolen automobile must have moved in interstate
commerce." H.R. REP. No. 102-851(I), 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 17 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2834.
253. It is conceivable that car dealers, as a service to their customers, could provide decals
for placement in the car's window that state, "Warning! This automobile has crossed state lines
and thus is subject to the Anti Car Theft Act. Theft of this vehicle will be punished to the fullest
extent of federal law." Foreign cars would automatically be protected; residents of Michigan,
and residents of Tennessee who own Saturns manufactured locally, could be offered a test-drive
prior to purchase that takes them across state lines. See United States v. Cortner, 834 F.Supp.
242,243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). Most certainly, the Framers would balk at the suggestion that fed-
eral jurisdiction could be permanently evoked over local activities by such a mere technicality.
However, even this might be unnecessary. In United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.
1983), the court reversed the conviction for possession of a firearm by a previously convicted
felon when the defendant, a Connecticut resident, had possessed a shotgun that had been manu-
factured in that state. Prosecutors failed to prove that the shotgun had at some time traveled
interstate and the court rejected the notion that the mere "process of manufacturing" sufficiently
affected commerce to provide nexus. Id. at 348. But in United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 456
(8th Cir. 1995), decided after Lopez, the court rejected the Second Circuit's "unjustifiedly nar-
row view of the relevant commerce" and found that even if the ammunition the defendant was
convicted of possessing had been manufactured within the state he had possessed it in, the con-
viction would be upheld if any of the ammunition's "component parts" had at any time prior to
manufacture traveled interstate.
So if the rule in Mosby becomes the majority rule despite Lopez, residents of Michigan and
Tennessee who purchase cars manufactured locally would not have to take that test-drive across
state lines to permanently evoke federal jurisdiction under ACTA if a single fan belt, hubcap, or
screw had been manufactured out of state.
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by almost every court called upon to render a decision on its
constitutionality.' s
1. United States v. Watson
The case most cited in support of section 101 is United States v. Wat-
son. 5 Although the court acknowledged that the Act "is a far reach-
ing attempt by Congress to address many aspects of car theft on the
federal level, ' 2 5 6 the court nevertheless upheld section 101 as constitu-
tional. The court relied on the standard announced in Hodel v. Indi-
ana,257 which allows courts to strike down Commerce Clause
legislation "only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a con-
gressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce... ."258
In determining whether section 101 of the Act meets the minimal
Hodel standard, the court set forth three contexts in which the Com-
merce Clause will support the enactment of federal criminal statutes:
One, where the regulation relates to things "in commerce," be it mis-
use of the channels of interstate commerce 259. .. or legitimate use of
the channels of interstate commerce260.. . ; two, where the targeted
activity occurs solely intrastate but affects interstate commerce 26 1 ... ;
and three, where the regulation involves protection of the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce themselves .... 262
Next, the court proceeded to justify section 101 within each of these
three contexts, something the court claims it had "little difficulty" do-
254. United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (Lopez "does not alter our view");
United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d
1090 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Johnson, 22 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 890 F. Supp. 67 (D.P.R.
1995) (decided after Lopez); United States v. Robertson, 861 F. Supp. 1031 (W.D. Okla. 1994);
United States v. Grant, 860 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Ga. 1994); United States v. Sabini, 842 F. Supp.
1446 (S.D. Fla. 1994); United States v. Payne, 841 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Ohio 1994); United States
v. Edmondson, 1994 WL 723959 (D. Kan. 1994); United States v. Howard, 1994 WL 544502 (D.
Kan. 1994); United States v. Watson, 815 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Stith,
824 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ohio 1993); United States v. Eskridge, 818 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
255. 815 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
256. Id. at 829 n.1.
257. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
258. Watson, 815 F. Supp. at 829 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 323-24). See supra note 200.
259. Watson, 815 F. Supp. at 829 (citing Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); Brooks
v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)).
260. Id. at 829-30 (citing Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
261. Id. at 830 (citing 18 U.S.C. sec. 891 (1994), et seq., which was upheld in Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
262. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. sec. 32 (1994), which criminalizes the destruction of aircraft). The
three contexts described by the Watson court are similar to those described by the Supreme
Court in Lopez with one important difference: in Lopez, activities must "substantially affect
interstate commerce," not merely "affect" it, as in Watson. See supra notes 210-213 and accom-
panying text.
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ing.2 63 Concerning the first context, the court summarily concluded,
"[g]iven the Supreme Court's historic acceptance of the assertion of
federal control over things that travel, or have traveled, in interstate
commerce, the power of Congress to regulate as it did in § 2119 can-
not be seriously questioned."2 " For the second context, the court
quoted legislative reports that set forth the effects car theft allegedly
has on interstate commerce, namely higher insurance premiums and
the cost of anti-theft devices endured by car owners, and ruled that
these findings served as a rational basis for the federal statute
criminalizing carjacking.2 6 Lastly, the court decided that automobiles
were "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" without setting forth
conclusive authority for this assertion.266
2. Cases Following Watson
Other courts have built upon the reasoning set forth in Watson. In
United States v. Johnson,267 the court relied on Barrett and Scarbor-
ough in finding that section 101 of the Act applies to any car that had
moved in interstate commerce at any time during its existence.268 The
Johnson court combined the first two contexts set forth in Watson and
stated, "[s]o long as the activity regulated has an effect on interstate
commerce it makes no difference that the transported item is now 'at
rest' and is no longer 'in' interstate commerce." 269 The court refused
to apply the definition of "in commerce" used in early cases under the
Dyer Act270 and emphasized in Schechter. In United States v. Stith,271
the court affirmed the notion that automobiles are instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and thus subject to federal regulation.272 At
least one court has said that in applying the Hodel test, it would be
263. Id.
264. Id. at 830-31.
265. "As these passages demonstrate, the enactment of sec. 2119 was at least partly the result
of a congressional finding that the post-theft sale of cars and their parts makes auto thefts, in-
cluding those in which cars are obtained through carjacking, a problem that affects interstate
commerce." Id. at 831.
266. "Clearly, there is no reason to suggest that if the power of Congress can be applied to
afford protection against destruction of aircraft, that power is not available to Congress to afford
similar protection against theft of automobiles." Id.
267. 22 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1994).
268. Id. at 108-09. "[A] present nexus between a regulated activity and interstate commerce
is not required under the Commerce Clause." United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398,1401 (9th
Cir. 1995).
269. Johnson, 22 F.3d at 109.
270. Id. at 108-09. See supra note 236.
271. 824 F. Supp. 128 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff'd, 38 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir. 1994).
272. Id. at 129. See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995), which upheld ACTA
despite Lopez and decided, inter alia, that automobiles are instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
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"impossible" to find that Congress had no rational basis whatsoever
for concluding that carjacking affects interstate commerce.273
3. United States v. Cortner, and Criticism of Watson
A small minority of federal courts has taken a stand for federalism
in the face of section 101 of the Act. In United States v. Cortner,274 the
court was faced with a pair of carjackers who, while in Tennessee,
stole a car that was later recovered in that state.275 Although there
were no allegations that the stolen car was destined for a chop shop or
intended to be shipped interstate, it had not been manufactured in
Tennessee, so it was presumed that at some time in the past it had
crossed state lines. 2 76
In concluding that section 101 fails to satisfy the minimal constitu-
tional test of Hodel, and thus "lacks any rational nexus to interstate
commerce and that the Congress lacks the power to legislate
thereon,"277 Judge Wiseman addressed the arguments raised in Wat-
son. Relying on common sense,278 Judge Wiseman concluded that the
assertion made in Watson that "because something once traveled in-
terstate it remains in interstate commerce after coming to rest in a
given state, is sheer sophistry." 279 If it were true that once something
bathed in the stream of interstate commerce it was forever after
washed in federal authority, there would be no point to maintaining
the window dressing of federalism that still exists. Since people can be
said to move in interstate commerce, the federal government would
have the power to dictate the lives of anyone who had ever crossed
state lines, all in the name of regulating commerce.2s0 There can be
no justification for this result, and to whatever extent Barrett and
273. United States v. Payne, 841 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (S.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd, 59 F.3d 171
(6th Cir. 1995).
274. 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d
135 (6th Cir. 1994).
275. Id.
276. "This is a pure case of intrastate automobile theft at gunpoint." Id.
277. Id. at 244.
278. "This Court, at one time, owned a 1932 Ford which was manufactured in Detroit in the
year 1931 and transported to the state of Tennessee. It remained in the state of Tennessee there-
after. Now if this car were hijacked today, some sixty years later, is it still in interstate com-
merce?" Id. at 243. Other commentators have pointed out similar absurdities. "If a window
washer in New York used a brush made in Ohio, that fact put the window washing into interstate
commerce. There was almost no such thing, at law, as purely intrastate commerce. The very
concept was pretty well buried." James J. Kilpatrick, Commerce Clause Due New Court Date,
SAr ArroNio ExPREss-NEws, Apr. 27, 1995.
279. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. at 243. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. Early cases
brought under the Dyer Act rejected this assertion. See supra note 236.
280. See supra note 92. "Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are
hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
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Scarborough support this unconstitutional assertion of federal power,
these cases should be overruled, if they have not already been effec-
tively overruled by Lopez.
By its terms, section 101 of the Act limits its jurisdiction so that the
second and third contexts discussed in Watson are irrelevant to this
section's constitutionality181 This is something the Watson court con-
ceded in its opinion,8 although given this concession it is not clear
why the court then analyzed section 101 within these contexts. 83
Nevertheless, in Cortner, the court addressed these contexts and re-
futed them as authority for the constitutionality of section 101.
As for the "affects commerce" context, Judge 'Wiseman said, "any
robbery of any merchant will cause an insurance loss which in turn
must be accounted for in the premiums of every other insured. If this
rationale can be used to justify this act under the Commerce Clause,
then there is absolutely no limit to what the Congress can do.' ' , Not
only has the Supreme Court long held that insurance contracts are not
interstate commerce,2s5 and thus higher insurance premiums cannot
logically be used to support Commerce Clause legislation, but the re-
maining findings on which Congress based the Act-higher costs
borne by the consumer-are in no way distinguishable from the
ramifications of every choice a person can make concerning his or her
life. Deciding who to live with, what to eat, where to go to college,
what job to take, whether to smoke or drink, or whether to have a
child are all decisions that may result in higher costs to the person and
281. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
282. "Since the statute applies only to cars that have crossed state lines, it applies only to
things which are said to be 'in commerce."' United States v. Watson, 815 F. Supp. 827, 830
(E.D. Pa. 1993). Therefore, the statute does not apply to things that merely "affect commerce"
or are "instrumentalities of commerce," so any justification of section 101 of the Act within these
contexts is irrelevant. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
283. Watson, 815 F. Supp. at 831. As for the second context, the "affects commerce" ration-
ale, the congressional findings asserting that car theft affects commerce were probably intended
to support the regulatory provisions of the Act, rather than section 101, a criminal provision
expressly limited by its terms, though not limited enough.
284. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. at 243. Similar justifications were cited and rejected by the Court
in Lopez, 115 S. CL at 1632. See also supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
285. Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 556 (1902) ("A contract of marine insurance is
not an instrumentality of commerce, but a mere incident of commercial intercourse."); Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896) (allowing states to prohibit foreign insurance companies from
doing business within the state, despite the Dormant Commerce Clause); Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868), which states:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce .... These contracts are not
articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word .... They are like other personal
contracts between parties which are completed by their signature and the transfer of the
consideration. Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though the parties may be
domiciled in different States .... They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the
local law.
The principle that the states may regulate insurance despite the Dormant Commerce Clause has
been codified at 15 U.S.C. sec. 1011 (1994).
1996]
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the community and certainly affect commerce. 6 The Commerce
Clause was never intended to give Congress that much power.
The third context, the assertion that automobiles are "instrumental-
ities of commerce," is equally unfounded. The Watson court's sole ba-
sis for this assertion is its analogy to airplanes,287 which have been
judged to be instrumentalities of commerce.288 No decision prior to
Watson has found that cars are instrumentalities of commerce. The
"instrumentalities" concept has generally been limited to common
carriers that operate interstate289 and are licensed by the federal gov-
ernment, 290 and specifically, airplanes are clearly distinguishable from
cars on this basis.291 Although automobiles can enter interstate com-
merce merely by crossing state lines, the possibility of this act alone
does not place them within the class of instrumentalities deserving
special federal attention.292
286. In Lopez, the Court criticized Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which would have
upheld the Gun-Free School Zones Act by reasoning that gun violence near schools affects class-
room learning, and thus affects interstate commerce as the adversely affected students enter the
workforce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "This analysis would be equally
applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education." Id.
at 1633.
287. See supra note 261.
288. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,150 (1970). Cases following Watson, such as Oliver
and Stith, that have upheld the application of the "instrumentalities" concept to automobiles
have relied solely on Watson and its misapplication of Perez without providing any additional
authority. In United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 890 F. Supp. 67 (D.P.R. 1995), the court upheld
ACA despite Lopez but rejected the idea that cars are instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
289. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (applied "instrumentality"
concept to interstate railroads because of their use as common carriers); Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885) (Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation of instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (found that
ferries that ply "navigable waters of the United States" are instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce, but refused to apply this categorization to ferries found in intrastate waters exclusively or
land transportation).
290. Suggesting that cars are instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and therefore subject
to federal regulation on that basis, ignores the fact that the states register cars and license driv-
ers, not the federal government. If cars were instrumentalities, the states would be precluded
under Gloucester Ferry, 144 U.S. at 204, from regulating the use of cars as they traditionally have
done, and still do today. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978), which refused
to allow a federal magistrate to order the suspension of a driver's license, issued by the state of
California, for drunk driving on a federal enclave. "Thus, if we were to uphold the magistrate's
order, we would be authorizing a federal court to require a California agency to carry out the
federal order to suspend a state-created privilege to drive on California's highways." Id. at 1102
(emphasis added).
291. "Air is an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by the com-
merce clause than is navigable water .... [An airplane's] privileges, rights and protection, so far
as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and not to any state govern-
ment." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
292. Judge Wiseman aptly pointed out:
If anything that will take you across a state line is an "instrumentality of commerce," then
there is justification for Congress to regulate anything done on a bicycle or, for that matter,
on foot. The Framers traveled to Philadelphia on horseback or by horse and carriage. Can
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Unfortunately, Judge Wiseman's reasoning did not fully convince
the Sixth Circuit, which reluctantly overruled Cortner.293 However,
Cortner should not be forgotten in this debate. Several of the courts
that have found section 101 of the Act to be constitutional have
agreed with Judge Wiseman that the federal police power, as con-
ceived by the Supreme Court, is far too broad.294 If it were not for
stare decisis, they probably would have found differently.295 Now,
with the recent Lopez decision, it appears that the Supreme Court
may yet again be willing to defend the principles of federalism and
halt the expansion of the federal police power. It remains to be seen
what impact Lopez will have on the Act, but it appears that a post-
Lopez challenge will have a much greater chance of succeeding. 296
it be imagined that in constructing the Commerce Clause they intended to regulate and
punish horse stealing?
United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
293. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd sub nom, United
States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994) (opinion available at 1994 WL 389210) (upholding
18 U.S.C. sec. 2119 (1994) even though "the connection to interstate commerce here was ex-
tremely tenuous.").
294. United States v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 1994) (section "stretch[es]
the outer limits of the Commerce Clause"); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 109 (6th Cir.
1994) ("It may be that the carjacking statute is unwise and encroaches on traditional views of
federalism... but it is not unconstitutional under current Commerce Clause doctrine." (cita-
tions omitted)); United States v. Grant, 860 F. Supp. 843, 844 (M.D. Ga. 1994) ("While this
court may agree with Judge Wiseman's outrage and frustration at criminalizing what are essen-
tially state crimes, it must reluctantly disagree with his holding."); United States v. Sabini, 842 F.
Supp. 1446, 1447 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (Highsmith, J.), which states:
In this regard, however, the Court disagrees with the Watson court's statement that such a
conclusion can be reached with "little difficulty".... Indeed, as demonstrated by the
lengthy analysis required to reach such a determination in Watson, and the forceful argu-
ments supporting the Cortner court's contrary findings of unconstitutionality, this further
federal incursion into the realm of common law crimes should give pause to those who, like
the undersigned, politically embrace the principles embodied by the concept known as "Our
Federalism."
(Citations omitted).
295. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. at 244, which states:
The Congress has a recent penchant for passing a federal criminal statute on any well-
publicized criminal activity. The courts, in an obeisant deference to the legislative branch,
have stretched the Commerce Clause of the Constitution beyond the wildest imagination of
the Framers and beyond any rational interpretation of the language itself.... The constant
lament is that the constitutional concept of Federalism is being eviscerated by the Congress.
The Congress is able to do this, however, only because we in the judicial branch are willing
to interpret the Commerce Clause so broadly.
See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
296. United States v. Mallory, 884 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Fla. 1995), was decided before Lopez
was decided by the Supreme Court. But in finding that ACrA sec. 101 was unconstitutional, the
Mallory court relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit opinion in United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342
(5th Cir. 1993). "[T]he presumption of constitutionality which attaches to congressional enact-
ments is not as strong where the court is called upon to police the constitutional boundary be-
tween the Tenth Amendment... and the Commerce Clause." Mallory, 884 F. Supp. at 498-99.
However, two such challenges have faired little better after Lopez. See United States v. Oli-
ver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 890 F. Supp. 67 (D.P.R. 1995).
It should be noted that before the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lopez,
the Fifth Circuit's views on the reach of the Commerce Clause were in the minority.
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CONCLUSION
The assertion that section 101 of the Act, and section 105 if inter-
preted broadly, is unconstitutional should not be construed to imply
that carjacking is not a serious problem. Violent crime in general, and
carjacking in particular, is believed by many to be the greatest prob-
lem our country faces today, although few can agree on the best
method of controlling this problem. In desperation, some have
looked to the federal government to provide the solution. As tempt-
ing as it may be, we should not allow the federal government to wield
power it has not been granted by the Constitution simply because vio-
lent crime appears to be out of control.2 97
"Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But
the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action
which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordi-
nary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.""98
These words were written at a time when the nation faced another
crisis-the Great Depression. In trying to deal with the Depression,
the federal government ignored these words and seized vast power
over local activities that it has never relinquished. If federalism is dis-
regarded for the sake of the public good and political expediency in
the fight against carjacking, the Constitution, as the "law of the land,"
will be substantially weakened and may not be able to serve its pri-
mary purpose-to prevent tyranny.
Without a doubt, carjackers should be punished severely. But this
punishment should be dispensed only by the states, not the federal
government, which the Framers did not trust with general police
power. While fighting against carjacking, we risk facilitating the hi-
jacking of the police power by the federal government and the loss of
federalism, without which the rights embodied in the remaining
amendments of the Bill of Rights are put in jeopardy.
297. "We shall never prevent the abuse of power if we are not prepared to limit power in a
way which occasionally may also prevent its use for desirable purposes." FrkmDRCH A. HAxmK,
Thm ROAD To SERFDOM 258 (50th anniversary ed. 1994).
298. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
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